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grands	 penseurs	 allemands	 du	 vingtième	 siècle,	 soit	 Martin	 Heidegger	 et	 Hans-Georg	
Gadamer.	La	motivation	de	ce	projet	découle	d’un	intérêt	marqué	pour	l’étude	de	modèles	
alternatifs	à	la	pensée	technoscientifique	de	la	connaissance.	Considérant	que	Heidegger	et	







particulière	 sur	 les	 cours	maintenant	publiés	du	plus	 jeune	Heidegger.	Dans	 le	deuxième	
chapitre,	nous	traitons	également	de	la	réappropriation	de	la	phronesis,	mais	cette	fois,	chez	
Gadamer	afin	de	mettre	en	 relief	 l’intérêt	que	présente	 la	phronesis	aristotélicienne	pour	
l’herméneutique,	mais	aussi	pour	 l’éthique	de	Gadamer.	La	dernière	partie	de	ce	chapitre	
propose	une	analyse	comparative	entre	l’interprétation	heideggérienne	et	gadamérienne	de	










The	present	study	aims	at	examining	 the	 interpretation	of	phronesis	 conducted	by	
two	central	figures	in	twentieth-century	German	philosophy,	namely	Martin	Heidegger	and	
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authority	or	Providence	since	the	time	of	 the	Enlightenment.	The	present	project	 is	 to	be	
located	within	the	broader	quest	of	reassessing	the	value	and	even	the	primordiality	of	the	




to	 the	 humanities,	 albeit	 in	 a	 radically	 different	manner.	 For	 the	 humanities	 to	 regain	 a	
central	 role	 in	our	 lives,	we	must	 reflect	more	deeply	on	 their	essence	 in	order	 to	better	



















Gadamer	 resorts	 to	 Aristotle	 once	 again	 and	 to	 his	 teacher	 Heidegger	 with	 the	 aim	 of	
challenging	 the	classical	conception	of	nineteenth	century	hermeneutics,	and	arrive	at	an	
alternative	 model	 for	 understanding	 and	 interpretation,	 which	 is	 more	 adequate	 to	 the	
humanities.		
	 The	concept	which	Gadamer	elects	as	a	model	 for	hermeneutics	 is	 the	Aristotelian	
notion	of	phronesis.	Gadamer	sees	in	phronesis	a	way	out	of	the	techno-scientific	rationality	
that	governs	 the	modern	age.	Aristotle	deals	with	 the	concept	of	 phronesis	 extensively	 in	




activities,	 poiesis,	 praxis	 and	 theoria.	 The	 former	 activity	 is	 associated	 with	 human	
intervention	in	the	material	world	and	the	production	of	tangible	outcomes,	whether	it	be	
the	production	of	a	glass,	or	the	restoration	of	someone’s	health.	In	order	to	produce	this	








the	 most	 worthwhile.	 In	 order	 to	 regulate	 this	 type	 of	 activity,	 one	 needs	 to	 possess	
phronesis,	 in	 the	eyes	of	Aristotle.	As	opposed	to	techne,	phronesis	 is	a	kind	of	knowledge	
which	is	less	formulable	and	more	flexible	and	depends	more	on	experience	than	technical	












same	 token	 inevitably	extends	our	 interest	 to	Gadamer’s	 teacher	and	prominent	German	


















Destruktion	 of	 the	 history	 of	 philosophy,	 which	 consisted	 in	 a	 re-evaluation	 of	 the	main	





	 Although	 Heidegger	 and	 Gadamer	 do	 not	 reappropriate	 phronesis	 for	 the	 same	
reasons	within	their	philosophy,	and	we	will	focus	on	these	differences,	they	do	take	up	the	
concept	 of	 phronesis	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 challenging	 a	 strong	 Cartesian	 doctrine	 that	 had	
dominated	the	philosophical	tradition	in	the	preceding	few	centuries.	Joseph	Dunne,	in	his	
prominent	work,	Beyond	Objectivism	and	Relativism	makes	a	brief	survey	of	Cartesianism	
and	 how	 twentieth	 century	 hermeneutics	 developed	 in	 reaction	 to	 the	 strict	 rationalist	
approach	of	Descartes.	Among	these	hitherto	uncontested	assumptions	of	Cartesianism,	the	
subject-object	dichotomy	figures	at	the	top	of	the	list.	Ever	since	Descartes,	philosophy	has	























considers	 is	 the	 right	way	of	 attaining	 true	knowledge.	That	 is	why	phronesis	appears	 so	




this	 inquiry	 is	 a	 more	 particular	 interest	 in	 the	 radically	 novel	 manner	 of	 conducting	
philosophy	of	Heidegger	and	how	 it	 influenced	his	student	Gadamer.	We	believe	 that	 the	









	 The	 present	 study	 is	 divided	 in	 two	 chapters.	 The	 first	 chapter	 is	 an	 in-depth	







this	 chapter,	we	highlight	 the	main	 themes	 that	 can	be	extracted	 from	a	 close	 reading	of	
Heidegger’s	 texts,	 namely	 the	 ramifications	 of	 the	 predominantly	 ontological	 scope	 of	
Heidegger’s	 project	 on	 the	 interpretation	 of	 phronesis,	 and	 the	 analysis	 of	 Heidegger’s	
interpretation	of	phronesis	within	 the	 reappropriation	of	 the	 famous	distinction	between	
sophia	and	phronesis.		









Gadamer’s	 reappropriation	 of	 phronesis.	 We	 attempt	 to	 highlight	 the	 idea	 that	 Gadamer	
followed	 closely	 the	 lead	 of	 his	 teacher,	 while	 at	 the	 same	 time	 making	 the	 concept	 of	
phronesis	 his	 own	 by	 integrating	 it	 in	 his	 quest	 for	 a	 more	 genuine	 conception	 of	 the	
Geisteswissenschaften	and	human	rationality.		
 






































	 The	 Phenomenological	 Interpretations	 with	 regards	 to	 Aristotle:	 Indication	 of	 the	
Hermeneutical	 Situation,	 also	 referred	 to	 as	 the	Aristotle-Introduction	 is	 a	 text	written	by	
Martin	 Heidegger	 in	 1923.	 This	 text	 can	 be	 regarded	 as	 an	 introduction	 to	 Heidegger’s	
phenomenological	 treatment	of	Aristotle.	 In	effect,	 it	 is	 an	 investigation	on	 the	history	of	










interpretation	 from	 life	 itself,	 not	 from	 any	 external	 point	 of	 view.	 It	 is	 a	 critical	 text	 in	
studying	the	genesis	of	Being	and	Time,	as	Heidegger	outlines	several	concepts	that	will	be	






Heidegger	 develops	 on	 the	 notion	 of	phronesis,	while	 he	 discusses	 Book	VI	 of	 the	
Nicomachean	Ethics	with	respect	to	the	dianoetic	virtues,	namely	sophia	and	phronesis,	as	
possibilities	 of	 “actualizing	 the	 genuine	 truthful	 safekeeping	 of	 Being”.	 He	 translates	
phronesis	as:	“solicitous	circumspection,	circumspection	which	is	concerned	with	one's	own	
as	well	as	others'	well-being”.	Here,	it	is	safe	to	state	that	Heidegger	underscores	the	ethical	




dealings	are	πρᾶξις:	 the	conducting	[Behandeln]	of	one's	own	self	 in	 the	How	of	dealings	







or	 the	 “how”	of	 these	dealings.	Phronesis	 is	an	aletheia	praktike;	 it	unconceals	a	practical	
truth,	from	Dasein’s	fallenness	into	the	“they’.	The	last	sentence	of	the	passage	highlights	the	








	This	 leads	 Heidegger	 to	 develop	 the	 notion	 of	 phronesis	 and	 offer	 a	 lengthy	
explanation,	which	expounds	on	the	interplay	between	phronesis,	Augenblick	and	Kairos:		
“The	 concrete	 interpretation	 shows	 how	 the	 being	 which	 is	 καιρός	 constitutes	 itself	 in	
φρόνησις.	The	actional	and	solicitous	[kind	of]	conducting	is	always	a	concrete	conducting	
in	the	How	of	the	concerned	dealings	with	the	world.	Φρόνησις	makes	the	location	of	the	one	
who	 performs	 the	 action	 accessible:	 in	 securing	 the	 οὗ	 ἕνεκα	 (the	 "Why"),	 in	 making	
available	 the	 particular	 Towards-what-end	 [Wozu],	 in	 apprehending	 the	 "Now",	 and	 in	
sketching	out	the	How	φρόνησις	looks	to	the	έσχατόν,	the	outermost,	the	extreme,	in	which	






such,	 as	 the	 that-with-respect-to-which	 of	 a	 concrete	 readiness-for-dealings,	 whose	
constitutive	illumination	is	determined	by	φρόνησις.”13	The	latter	part	of	this	fragment	from	
the	Natorp	Report	indicates	that,	although	the	action	has	not	yet	been	actualized,	it	is	“held	










particular	 temporality	 of	 each	 situation	 is	 so	 unique	 that	 it	 cannot	 be	 understood	 and	
compartmentalized	through	logos.	This	particularity	could	only	be	grasped	through	aisthesis.	
Thus,	 the	 Augenblick	 is	 the	 moment	 in	 which	 the	 grasping	 of	 the	 particular	 givens	 of	 a	
situation	occurs	and	informs	the	broader	scope	of	phronesis,	which	eventually	will	involve	
deliberation.	 Therefore,	 deliberation	 is	 dependent	 upon	 what	 is	 already	 given	 in	 the	




by	 Heidegger	 to	 this	 intuitive	 character	 of	 phronesis,	 which	 is	 intrinsically	 bound	 to	 the	
notion	 of	 Augenblick,	 is	 of	 critical	 significance	 and	 bears	 noteworthy	 ramifications	 in	




GA	 18,	 Grundbegriffe	 der	 aristotelischen	 Philosophie,	 is	 a	 lecture	 course	 given	 by	
Aristotle	during	the	1924	summer	semester.	It	constitutes	one	of	the	main	works	in	which	


















the	 everydayness	 of	 Dasein,	 in	 order	 to	 illuminate	 the	 ontological	 ramifications	 of	
everydayness.	 It	 is	 an	 investigation	 which	 departs	 from	 the	 ontic.	 Precisely,	 it	 is	 an	
ontological	interpretation	of	language	and	life	that	stems	from	Heidegger’s	reinterpretation	
of	 Aristotle’s	 Rhetoric.	 Furthermore,	 it	 is	 important	 to	 underscore	 that	 in	 this	 lecture,	




GA	 18	 was	 not	 written	 by	 Heidegger	 himself,	 but	 based	 upon	 several	 manuscript	 notes	
written	by	his	 students.	The	 strong	cohesion	 that	emerges	 from	 the	 comparison	of	 these	
notes	suggests	that	it	is	nonetheless	a	reliable	source	of	Heidegger’s	thought.	
Heidegger	 turns	to	Aristotle’s	Rhetoric,	as	 it	provides	an	 insight	 to	philosophy	and	







which	 denoted	multiple	meanings	 in	 the	 Ancient	 Greek	 Language,	 among	which	we	 can	
identify	“reason”	and	“speech”.	They	acknowledged	the	fact	that	both	philosophy	and	science	
could	only	exist	and	prosper	by	means	of	language.	However,	Heidegger	underscores	that	
the	 primordial	 sense	 of	 logos	 in	 Aristotle’s	 corpus	 is	 speech	 and	 not	 reason.	 The	 latter	
meaning	of	the	word	emerges	after	the	works	of	Aristotle,	according	to	Heidegger.	He	does	
not	 dismiss	 the	 other	 meanings	 of	 logos,	 nevertheless	 he	 does	 maintain	 that	 they	 are	
ancillary,	and	that	it	would	obscure	our	understanding	of	Aristotle	if	we	were	to	take	any	
other	 sense	 of	 logos	 other	 than	 that	 of	 discourse	 as	 its	 primary	 sense.	 Language	 is	what	
ultimately	 differentiates	 us	 from	 the	 being-in-the-world	 of	 the	 animals.	 Moreover,	 he	




that	 is,	 rhetoric	 is	 inextricably	 linked	 to	ethics	 insofar	 as	 language	 is,	 also,	dependant	on	
affects	and	as	a	 consequence	Heidegger	discusses	 the	Aristotelean	notion	of	pathos.	 	The	
successful	achievement	of	a	speech	depends	on	the	one	hand,	on	the	ethos	of	the	speaker	and	
on	the	other	hand	on	the	pathé	(affects)	of	the	listener.	Pathos	corresponds	to	the	finding-














Moreover,	 in	 this	 lecture,	 Heidegger	 discusses	 the	 notion	 of	 deliberation.	 This	




how	 kairos	 is	 constitutive	 of	 deliberation.	 Heidegger	 says	 about	 deliberation:	 “In	 this	
bringing-to-language	of	the	συμφέρον,	of	the	world	insofar	as	it	is	concretely	there,	the	world	





















one	of	 the	 three	 conditions	 the	 speaker	must	 satisfy	 in	 order	 to	 bring	 about	pistis	 in	 his	





















Heidegger	discusses	once	more	 the	notion	of	phronesis	 in	 relation	 to	 the	 praxis	of	
human	being.	He	differentiates	between	 techne	 as	ergon,	 and	praxis	 as	ergon,	 in	order	 to	
determine	what	makes	a	 praxis	 virtuous.	On	 the	one	hand,	 a	 techne	 that	 is	deemed	good	
depends	upon	its	telos,	whereas	a	praxis	which	is	deemed	virtuous	contains	the	telos	in	itself,	





















More	 importantly,	 this	 anticipatory	 orientation,	 which	 already	 guides	 action	 lies	 in	
prohairesis.	Prohairesis	is	the	ethical	disposition	which	is	taken	up	in	advance	by	Dasein;	it	is	
the	 way	 in	 which	 one	 opens	 oneself	 to	 the	 situation	 and	 the	 Augenblick.	 And	 this	 very	
prohairesis	 is	 the	 decisive	 factor,	 which	 determines	 the	way	 one	 is,	 for	 one’s	 being,	 and	
ultimately	for	one’s	ethos.		
In	 this	 lecture,	Heidegger	often	 refers	 to	phronesis	 as	 a	 “looking-around”.	At	 some	
point	 he	 also	 describes	 phronesis	 as	 follows:	 “It	 is	 the	 kind	 of	 ὁρίζεσθαι	 that	 a	φρóνιμος	
would	do,	λέγειν	as	λέγειν	of	the	φρóνιμος;	seeing	not	only	as	looking-toward	that	brings	






one	 must	 always	 have	 the	 bigger	 picture	 in	 mind	 in	 order	 to	 deliver	 a	 speech,	 which	
engenders	pistis	in	the	listener,	one	must	also	be	able	to	place	the	issue	at	hand	in	a	wider	
framework	 so	 that	 one	 can	 choose	 the	 most	 virtuous	 path	 of	 action.	 Heidegger	 also	
characterized	phronesis	as	a	“being-in-care	about	being-there”.	Hence,	one	must	care	about	
the	facticity	of	the	given	situation	and	must	also	care	about	something	that	is	beyond	oneself,	











This	 lecture	 is	 undoubtedly	 helpful	 for	 us	 in	 bringing	 into	 relief	 what	 Heidegger	
intended	when	 interpreting	and	making	use	of	 the	Aristotelean	concept	of	phronesis.	The	
most	crucial	aspect	of	 this	 interpretation	 is	 the	emphasis	 that	 is	exerted	on	the	 temporal	
character	of	phronesis,	 the	kairos.	When	 integrating	phronesis	 into	one	of	his	discussions,	
whether	it	is	regarding	the	ethos	of	the	speaker	in	connection	with	the	pistis	in	the	listener	








not	 to	 confuse	 this	 “bigger	 picture”	with	 having	 a	 detached	 standpoint	with	 respect	 to	 a	
situation,	 because	 one	 must	 indeed	 be	 informed	 by	 a	 larger	 portrait	 of	 the	 particular	







	 In	 this	 lecture,	 Heidegger	 deals	 exhaustively	with	 the	 concept	 of	phronesis.	 It	 is	 a	
lecture	 course,	 which	 immediately	 succeeds	 the	 GA	 18	 lecture	 course.	 That	 is	 why,	 the	
ramifications	that	stem	from	this	lecture	are	quite	similar	to	those	of	the	previous	one,	albeit	








One	 of	 the	 most	 important	 achievement	 of	 this	 lecture	 pertaining	 to	 Heidegger’s	
interpretation	is	the	retrieval	of	the	different	modes	of	aletheuein,	which	signify	that	there	is	
no	unitary	truth	that	is	universalizable	to	all	domains	of	human	life.	Indeed,	the	recovery	of	












logistikon,	 whereas	 sophia	 is	 the	 highest	 possibility	 pertaining	 to	 the	 epistèmonikon.	
Phronesis	is	concerned	with	what	can	be	otherwise,	namely	an	action	which	is	contingent	on	
its	specific	circumstances,	while	at	the	same	time	being	able	to	change	the	course	of	these	
circumstances.	 Phronesis	 is	 described	 as	 the	 ability	 to	 deliberate	 well,	 not	 merely	 with	
regards	to	a	particular	end,	but	with	regards	to	zoe	itself.	It	is	on	the	basis	of	their	telos	that	
phronesis	and	techne	are	distinguished.	Although	techne	also	deals	with	objects	that	can	be	
otherwise,	 its	 telos	 concerns	 final	 products	whose	arche	 is	 another,	whereas	 the	 telos	of	
phronesis	 lies	 in	anthropos	 itself.	Heidegger	 underscores	 the	 ability	 that	phronesis	 has	 to	
render	Dasein	transparent	to	 itself,	namely	the	capacity	of	phronesis	to	uncover	Dasein	 to	
itself.	 Uncovering	Dasein	 to	 itself	 entails	 that	Dasein	 is	 initially	 covered	 up	 to	 itself.	 It	 is	
covered	up	by	Dasein’s	immediate	involvements	in	everydayness,	in	the	“they”,	as	Heidegger	




Later	 on,	 Heidegger	 contends	 that	must	 never	 be	 taken	 for	 granted.	Dasein	 experiences	
continuous	struggle	in	an	effort	to	go	against	the	propensity	of	covering	oneself.	Heidegger	















of-insight	 (Augenblick).	We	will	 further	examine	both	of	 these	aspects	of	phronesis	 in	 the	
following	paragraphs.		
	 Indeed,	Heidegger	emphasizes	the	non-autonomous	character	of	phronesis.	Phronesis	


















determined	by	arete,	 by	 the	πράκτον	as	ἀγαθόν.[…]	The	mere	 self-standing	αληθεύειν	of	
φρόνησις	has	no	effect	 on	action	unless	 this	φρόνησις	 is	 carried	out	by	 someone	who	 is	
himself	ἀγαθός.”23	Therefore,	we	can	conclude	that	the	ethical	virtues	must	have	precedence	
over	phronesis	in	the	accomplishment	of	the	virtuous	agent.		
	 In	 GA	 18,	 Heidegger	 discussed	 briefly	 the	 relationship	 between	 phronesis	 and	
aisthesis,	as	he	highlighted	the	fact	that	phronesis	is	not	merely	a	hexis	meta	logou,	but	it	is	
also	 a	 kind	 of	 aisthesis.	 However,	 it	 is	 more	 so	 in	 GA	 19	 and	 in	 the	 Phenomenological	
Interpretations	with	Respect	to	Aristotle	discussed	previously,	that	Heidegger	develops	more	










cannot	 be	 understood	 in	 the	 same	 terms	 as	 a	 geometric	 aisthesis,	 precisely	 because	 the	
objects	 studied	 by	 geometry	 are	 universal	 and	 atemporal,	whereas	phronesis	 as	 aisthesis	









aspect	of	phronesis	 is	 carried	out	via	 logos,	 that	 is	euboulia,	 but	 it	 is	more	 fundamentally	







while	 simultaneously	 constituting	 that	 towards	 which	 the	 whole	 of	 the	 deliberation	 is	
oriented.	Phronesis,	while	being	 informed	by	a	much	wider	environment	 than	 that	of	 the	
concrete	situation,	must	be	extremely	perceptive	and	responsive	 to	 the	Augenblick	of	 the	
circumstances	 and	must	 carefully	 decide	 on	 the	 kairos	 of	 the	 action.	Whilst	 phronesis	 is	
shaped	by	one’s	hexeis,	by	one’s	aims,	by	one’s	theoria,	and	by	one’s	comprehension	of	life	in	
its	entirety,	it	must	also	be	sensitive	to	the	Augenblick	of	the	situation,	to	the	here	and	now	











particularity	 of	 the	 situation	 one	 is	 confronted	 with	 in	 phronesis.	 Kairos	 designates	 the	
opportune	moment	of	action.	Heidegger	also	stipulates	that	phronesis	and	sophia	have	the	









Heidegger,	as	 their	view	of	 time	constitutes	an	 inauthentic	one.	The	notion	of	Augenblick	
drawn	from	phronesis,	played	a	crucial	role	in	the	ekstatic	conception	of	the	temporality	of	
Dasein.		
	 In	 Heidegger’s	 Sophist,	 lies	 therein	 a	 rich	 analysis	 of	 the	 concept	 of	 phronesis,	
















this	 investigation.	 It	 is	 exactly	 this	 character	 of	 phronesis,	 which	 exceeds	 rational	
understanding	 that	 is	 taken	 up	 by	 Heidegger,	 contra	 the	 purely	 scientific	 conducting	 of	
phenomenology,	 and	 which	 heavily	 influenced	 Gadamer.	 Indeed,	 Gadamer	 encountered	
Aristotle	through	these	early	Heideggerian	lectures	and	claimed	that	Heidegger	:	“took	his	
first,	decisive	distance	from	‘phenomenology	as	a	strict	science”28	Heidegger,	expanding	on	





power	 of	phronesis	 to	 shed	 light	 on	 phenomena	 that	 cannot	 be	 elucidated	 by	 a	 rigorous	
science	is	one	of	the	main	reasons	for	which	both	Heidegger	and	Gadamer	are	drawn	to	the	
Aristotelean	 phronesis.	 In	 the	 next	 chapter,	 we	 will	 turn	 to	 the	 secondary	 literature	
pertaining	 to	Heidegger’s	 interpretation	of	phronesis,	 as	we	will	examine	what	Heidegger	
achieved	through	his	interpretation	of	Aristotle,	and	more	particularly,	phronesis.		
	 In	 the	 following	 analysis,	 we	 will	 concentrate	 on	 the	 ontologization	 of	 phronesis	
effected	by	Heidegger	of	Aristotle’s	work,	more	precisely	of	the	NE.	We	will	also	examine	the	






































would	 be	 almost	 impossible	 to	 remove	 any	 normative	 ethical	 implications	 from	 the	
Heideggerian	concept	of	authenticity.	In	addition,	in	the	previous	examination	of	Heidegger’s	
early	 lectures	 pertaining	 to	 Aristotle,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 the	 agathon	 constitutes	 a	 central	
element.	Therefore,	even	if	Heidegger	does	not	use	the	traditional	language	of	ethics,	it	does	
not	imply	that	he	is	not	preoccupied	with	ethics	altogether.	In	GA	19,	Heidegger	is	mostly	
interested	 in	 the	kind	of	 relationship	 the	dianoetical	aretai,	namely	phronesis	 and	 techne	




















F.	 Volpi34,	 which	 has	 influenced	 numerous	 scholars	 and	 on	 which	 most	 seem	 to	 be	 in	
agreement.	 His	 main	 tenets	 are	 that,	 in	 his	 interpretation,	 Heidegger	 posits	 Dasein’s	
determinations	as	strictly	ontological	:	(1)	“as	ways	of	being	in	the	strict	sense,	such	that	all	
ontic	meaning	is	excluded	in	principle”35	and	(2)	"their	content	is	not	something	that	Dasein	
can	 freely	 choose	 to	 have	 or	 not	 to	 have	 but	 is	 something	 from	 which	 it	 cannot	 be	
abstracted”36.	We	might	be	 in	 agreement	with	 the	 second	proposition,	 but	 the	 first	 tenet	
seems	to	be	quite	difficult	to	maintain,	as	there	are	inevitable	ontic	ramifications	that	result	
from	 the	 establishment	 of	 a	 way	 of	 Being.	 Furthermore,	 Heidegger’s	 own	 ontological	
investigation	begins	from	the	ontic	level.		
One	cannot	claim	that	Heidegger	does	not	retain	any	ethical	concern,	when	carrying	
out	 the	 ontologization	 of	 Aristotle’s	 Nicomachean	 Ethics.	 Thanassas	 claims	 that	 the	
ontologization	of	Heidegger	was	already	latent	in	Aristotle,	and	does	not	necessarily	imply	a	
complete	 disregard	 for	 ethics.	 According	 to	 Thanassas,	 the	 ontological	 and	 ethical	





already	contains	an	ontological	 character,	 in	 the	 sense	 that	 it	presents	us	with	a	 ”way	of	
















making	 an	 action	 transparent.	 Conscience	 cannot	 be	 forgotten.”38	 Some	 have	 used	 this	







According	 to	 Volpi,	 this	 ontologization	 is	 predicated	 upon	 Aristotle’s	 own	 claim	 that	
phronesis	is	something	more	than	an	“έξις	αληθής	μετά	λόγου	πρακτικών	περί	τα	ανθρώπω	
αγαθά	και	πρακτική”.	In	Aristotle’s	view,	there	is	something	of	phronesis’	essence	that	cannot	















cannot	 be	 viewed	 and	 characterized	 as	 an	 ethical	 dismissal.	 It	 is	 also	 what	 Heidegger	
explicitly	states	in	one	of	his	first	manuscripts	dealing	with	Aristotle,	the	Phenomenological	
Interpretations	with	Respect	to	Aristotle:	“The	Ethics,	as	the	explication	of	the	being	which	in	
Being-human,	human-life,	 the	movement	of	 life,	 is	 then	 to	be	placed	 into	 this	ontological	
horizon.”39	Pace	Taminiaux,	Heidegger’s	concern	for	the	good	is	obvious	in	many	parts	of	his	



























life	 at	 stake	 in	 the	 critical	 practice.”42	What	 is	 described	 by	Reid	 is	 precisely	 the	 kind	 of	




















ethical	 from	the	very	start.	Philosophy	 is	not,	 according	 to	 the	early	Heidegger,	detached	
inquiry,	 an	 attempt	 to	 get	 things	 right,	 at	 least	 not	 in	 that	 (objectifying)	 way:	 the	
philosophical	 attitude	 is	 a	 life-stance,	 and	philosophy	 itself	 a	 paradigmatic	way	of	 life.”44	
Hence,	in	Heidegger’s	reinterpretation	of	the	human	being	as	Dasein,	he	is	simultaneously	
aiming	at	a	redefinition	of	the	“how”	of	our	way	of	being	in	the	world,	as	he	puts	it	in	GA	18:	
“Άγαθόν	 is	 not	 an	 objective	 thing	 buzzing	 around,	 but	 instead	 it	 is	 a	how	 of	 being-there	
itself”45	In	this	passage,	it	is	clear	that	Heidegger	understands	the	good	as	an	integral	part	of	





















and	 that	 it	 is	 profoundly	 entrenched	 in	 our	 consciousness,	more	 so	 than	 any	 theoretical	




Dasein	 as	 care.	 Further,	 in	 GA	 18,	 Heidegger	 makes	 it	 clear	 that	 care	 is	 a	 care	 about	
something,	 a	 care	 which	 is	 directed	 towards	 the	 good:	 “As	 knowing-one’s-way-around,	
concern	 about	 something	 has	 an	 agathon	 within	 itself,	 explicitly	 there.	 Concern	 is	 not	
something	different	 than,	 and	 so	only	 accidentally,	 a	 being-after	 [the	 good].”46	 In	 light	 of	
these	assertions,	it	would	be	an	arduous	task	to	maintain	that	Heidegger	does	not	take	into	
account	 the	ethical	 in	any	way	or	 respect.	Heidegger’s	 concern	 for	 the	ethical	 is	palpable	
throughout	his	work,	although	it	might	not	be	prima	facie	evident.	We	can	view	the	whole	
project	of	phenomenological	destruction	and	formal	 indication	 in	 light	of	a	deeply	ethical	
consideration	on	Heidegger’s	behalf.	Indeed,	the	ultimate	purpose	of	Heidegger	conducting	
this	 phenomenological	 destruction	 of	 the	 history	 of	 philosophy	 and	 his	 project	 of	







and	 this	 is	 to	be	 considered	ultimately	 as	 an	 ethical	 truth.47	 Thus,	 the	 ethical	 function	of	
Heidegger’s	phenomenological	destruction	is	precisely	to	confront	ourselves	with	the	truth	










falls	 on	 an	 Aristotelian	 ideal	 of	 practical	 wisdom	 (phronesis),	 in	 other	 contexts	 Kant’s	
distinction	 between	 things	 and	 persons	 and	 the	 life	 of	 freedom	 come	more	 sharply	 into	
focus.”48	Indeed,	what	we	have	tried	to	demonstrate	is	that	the	ontologization	of	Aristotelean	
philosophy	and	more	particularly	of	phronesis	does	not	amount	into	an	ethical	abstraction.	
Phronesis,	 as	 it	 has	 been	 examined	 in	 the	 previous	 sections,	 obviously	 encompasses	 an	
ethical	meaning.	Phronesis	as	solicitous	circumspection,	as	self-transparency,	as	an	integral	
part	of	the	ethos	of	a	speaker,	all	these	aspects	attributed	to	phronesis	by	Heidegger	point	to	










	 The	 examination	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 σοφία	 and	 φρόνησις	 is	 of	 capital	
importance	for	the	purposes	of	this	inquiry,	as	it	is	an	indispensable	element	of	Aristotle’s	




will	be	 to	elucidate	Heidegger’s	stance	pertaining	 to	 the	relationship	between	sophia	 and	
phronesis.	In	order	to	render	evident	Heidegger’s	stance	on	this	issue,	which	is	complex	and	
has	yielded	a	lot	of	conflictual	scholarly	debate,	it	is	of	crucial	importance	that	we	turn	to	his	
initial	 intentions.	 We	 are	 well	 aware	 that	 Heidegger’s	 main	 project	 was	 to	 establish	 an	
authentic	way	of	doing	philosophy.	That	is	why	he	turned	to	tradition,	namely	in	order	to	




philosophy	 a	 way	 of	 conducting	 philosophy	 which	 is	 authentic.	 Therefore,	 he	 inevitably	
turned	to	the	Greek	fathers	of	philosophy:	Plato	and	Aristotle.		













debate	 amongst	 scholars,	 some	 of	which	 claim	 that	 Heidegger	 reappropriates	 Aristotle’s	
primacy	of	sophia	over	phronesis	with	the	ultimate	aim	of	refuting	his	position	and	others	
maintain	 that	 Heidegger	 follows	 Aristotle	 in	 considering	 phronesis	 as	 inferior	 to	 sophia,	
although	both	are,	without	a	doubt,	considered	as	the	highest	modes	of	reason.	The	goal	of	
this	inquiry	is	not	to	settle	this	debate	once	and	for	all	as	it	is	way	beyond	our	scope,	but	we	
still	 want	 to	 be	 able	 to	 compare	 Gadamer’s	 interpretations	 of	 Aristotle	 with	 the	
interpretations	 held	 by	 his	 master,	 and	 for	 that	 we	 need	 to	 grasp	 Heidegger’s	 own	




will	 still	 attempt	 to	 demonstrate	 that	 there	 are	 clear	 signs	 pointing	 to	 the	 similarities	 of	
Heidegger’s	concept	of	authenticity	and	his	analysis	of	σοφία	in	GA	19,	which	alludes	to	the	









this	 seemingly	 inconsistent	 position	 held	 by	 Heidegger.	 We	 will	 take	 a	 look	 at	 the	
commentaries	of	Jacques	Taminiaux52,	Pavlos	Kontos53	and	F.J.	Gonzales54,	all	going	against	
some	 parts	 of	 Franco	 Volpi’s	 influential	 commentary,	 which	 associates	 sophia	 to	
inauthenticity.	First,	we	will	expose	the	manner	 in	which	Heidegger	stands	together	with	




Heidegger	 tackles	 the	 supreme	modality	 of	 theoria,	 which	 is	 sophia,	 according	 to	
Aristotle.	Ultimately,	this	is	what	interests	Heidegger	the	most	in	GA	19,	as	his	main	goal	is	
to	address	Plato’s	dialogue,	which	presents	the	bios	theoretikos	as	the	highest	way	of	 life.	






chatter	 and	 everyday	 considerations	 that	 stem	 from	 the	 immediacy	 of	 aisthesis,	 as	 he	
discusses	 in	 GA	 19	 :	 “Σοφία,	 however,	 is	 concerned	 with	 advancing	 into	 what	 remains	














of	 authenticity	 in	 the	 eyes	 of	 Heidegger.	 Indeed,	 totality	 and	 rigor	 characterize	 the	
Aristotelean	 σοφία	 and	 Heidegger	 transposes	 these	 qualities	 to	 his	 own	 notion	 of	




	 Furthermore,	 sophia’s	 teleiosis	 is	 ευδαιμονία	 which	 Heidegger	 translates	 as	
Eigentlichkeit	 (authenticity).	 Again,	 here	 we	 can	 see	 how	 Heidegger’s	 appropriation	 of	
Aristotle	 serves	 the	 project	 that	 he	 elaborates	 more	 in	 depth	 in	 BT.	 It	 is	 sophia,	 the	




phronesis—as	 it	 arises	when	 one	 has	moved	beyond	 everydayness	 and	 has	 captured	 the	
totality,	which	is	simultaneously	the	goal	and	the	principle	of	Dasein	and	is	achieved	through	








the	purely	ontological	 concept	of	 the	good.	However,	 there	still	 remains	a	problem:	even	
though	σοφία	can	accomplish	itself	autonomously	and	is	directed	towards	the	pure	concept	
















demonstrates	 that,	 while	 he	 is	 upholding	 the	 primacy	 of	 sophia,	 the	 latter	 concept	









This	ultimately	 refers	 to	 the	being-toward-death,	which	 is	attained	when	Dasein	becomes	




it	 fundamentally	 is,	 is	being-toward-death.	This	view	of	 the	whole	 is	what	guarantees	 the	
authenticity	of	Dasein	as	 for-the-sake-of-which.	What	σοφία	is	for	Aristotle,	Heidegger	has	




why	 and	 how	 sophia	 upholds	 the	 superiority,	 as	 its	 attributes	 correspond	 to	 those	 of	
authenticity	in	Being	and	Time.	 It	 is	via	the	state	of	sophia	 that	one	actually	realizes	one’s	

















































with	 many	 others	 that	 we	 have	 highlighted,	 demonstrates	 how	 Heidegger	 is	 not	 solely	
interpreting	Aristotle,	but	he	is	equally	expressing	his	own	vision	through	the	appropriation	
of	Aristotle.	This	predilection	for	σοφία	is	also	evident	in	his	previous	manuscript	of	1922,	
Phenomenological	 Interpretations	 with	 Respect	 to	 Aristotle,	 to	 which	 Gadamer	 made	 the	
remark	 that	 Heidegger’s	 attention	 focused	 on	 σοφία	 rather	 than	 on	 phronesis.	 In	 this	
manuscript,	Heidegger	equally	maintains	that	σοφία	does	not	look	at	life	as	its	object,	but	
rather	that	it	unfolds	in	the	very	movement	of	life,	in	its	being.		











constitutes	 the	originary	 structure	 to	which	 techne	 and	 sophia	 are	 construed	as	 counter-
movements	(Gegentendenz).	On	the	one	side,	τέχνη,	associated	with	Verfallen,	constitutes	the	
inauthentic	 tendency	of	 immediate	Dasein	 and	 sophia	 designates	 the	 “counter-movement	
against	immediate	Dasein”.	Phronesis	is	characterized	by	the	transparency	to	oneself.	It	is	the	
space	 that	 allows	 for	 disclosure	 of	 what	 separates	 Dasein	 from	 its	 ends,	 according	 to	
Heidegger.	 	As	F.	Volpi	puts	 it,	conscience	corresponds	to	the	space	in	which	Dasein	 finds	
itself	when	it	is	ready	to	hear	the	call	of	conscience.	That	is	the	first	step	in	the	realization	of	
Dasein’s	 authentic	 self.	 Phronesis	 constitutes	 this	 horizon	 in	 which	 authenticity	 can	 be	
achieved,	as	conscience	constitutes	the	horizon	in	which	Dasein’s	own	authenticity	can	be	
actualized,	 but	 it	 is	 not	 authenticity	 itself.	 It	 fundamentally	 precedes	Dasein’s	 inevitable	
concealment	in	inauthenticity	as	well	as	its	realization	as	authentic.	It	is	the	space	in	which	
Dasein	can	hear	the	call	to	authenticity.		
	 In	 sum,	we	 have	 showed	 that	 Heidegger	 stands	 by	 the	 superiority	 of	 sophia	 over	
phronesis,	but	he	nevertheless	subjects	the	notion	of	σοφία	to	a	transformation,	which	strips	
it	away	 from	any	pre-judgments	embedded	 in	 the	philosophical	 tradition.	He	 finds	 in	 the	
qualities	of	σοφία	a	more	authentic	and	radical	way	of	being	Dasein,	which	he	transposes	to	

















what	 Heidegger	 wanted	 to	 arrive	 at	 was	 a	 merge	 of	 these	 two	 spheres	 by	 destroying	







the	 notion	 of	 phronesis.	 We	 attempted	 to	 bring	 into	 relief	 the	 basic	 characteristics	 of	
phronesis	 that	 Heidegger	 took	 up	 from	 Aristotle.	 Thereafter,	 we	 analyzed	 the	 broader	
ramifications	of	Heidegger’s	 interpretation	of	Aristotle,	which	 consisted	of	 an	ontological	
reappropriation	 of	 Aristotle’s	 philosophy.	 The	 main	 conclusions	 were	 that	 Heidegger’s	
ontologization	 of	 phronesis	 lead	 him	 to	 equate	 phronesis	 to	 Gewissen.	 In	 spite	 of	 this	
ontologization,	we	have	maintained	that	Heidegger	is	still	concerned	with	the	notion	of	the	
good	 and	 how	 one	 is	 to	 lead	 a	 good	 life,	 albeit	 not	 working	 within	 a	 traditional	 moral	





























	 In	 the	 preceding	 chapter,	 we	 focused	 on	 Heidegger’s	 reappropriation	 of	 the	
Aristotelean	 concept	 of	 phronesis.	 This	 analysis,	 also	 conducted	 for	 its	 own	 sake,	 is	
indispensable	for	a	more	comprehensive	and	profound	understanding	of	Gadamer’s	use	of	
phronesis.	In	the	course	of	this	second	chapter,	our	attention	will	be	focused	on	Gadamer’s	












manuscripts	 in	 which	 Heidegger	 solicits	 Aristotle	 and	 more	 particularly	 the	 notion	 of	
phronesis.	There	is	no	doubt	that	the	Natorp	Bericht,	examined	in	the	first	chapter	along	with	
numerous	 other	 courses	 taught	 by	 Heidegger	 and	 thereafter	 published,	 has	 exerted	 a	












own	 understanding	 of	 philosophic	 hermeneutics	 can	 itself	 be	 interpreted	 as	 a	 series	 of	
footnotes	on	his	decisive	intellectual	encounter	with	Aristotle.”65	To	this	statement,	we	could	










the	 relationship	 between	 phronesis	 and	 hermeneutics	 and	 to	 understand	 the	 position	 it	











very	 first	 writings,	 until	 his	 very	 last	 ones.	 Therefore,	 we	 will	 expose	 the	 centrality	 of	
phronesis	 in	 Gadamer’s	 hermeneutical	 philosophy	 while	 simultaneously	 bringing	 to	 the	
forefront	the	ethical	implications	brought	about	by	Gadamer’s	rehabilitation	of	Aristotelian	
philosophy	 and	 its	 connection	 to	 hermeneutics,	 and	 more	 broadly	 Gadamer’s	 whole	
philosophy.		
	 We	 will	 begin	 by	 addressing	 the	 hermeneutical	 context	 to	 which	 Gadamer	 was	
reacting,	 namely	 the	 hermeneutical	 tradition	 of	 Schleiermacher	 and	 Dilthey,	 prevalent	






we	will	 try	 to	 elucidate	what	 Gadamer	meant	when	 he	 claimed	 that	phronesis	 had	 to	 be	
regarded	as	 “a	model	of	 the	problem	of	hermeneutics”66	 even	 though	Aristotle	was	quite	
obviously	not	directly	concerned	with	hermeneutics.	We	will	also	attempt	to	bring	to	light	







by	Kant?	 In	 order	 to	 respond	 to	 this	 question,	we	will	 turn	 to	 later	 essays	 published	 by	
Gadamer,	namely	On	the	Possibility	of	a	Philosophical	Ethics	published	in	1963.		
	 In	this	next	section,	we	will	briefly	try	to	go	over	Gadamer’s	idea	of	hermeneutics	and	
how	 it	 developed,	 both	 in	 reaction	 to	 classical	 hermeneutics	 and	 also	 in	 continuity	with	













that	 were	 taught	 by	 Heidegger.	 Two	 of	 these	 seminars	 dealt	 with	 Aristotle:	
“Phenomenological	 Exercises	 for	 beginners	 in	 view	 of	 the	 Nicomachean	 Ethics”	 and	
“Phenomenological	Interpretations	of	Aristotle”.	These	seminars	and	more	importantly	his	
encounter	with	Heidegger	were	pivotal	for	Gadamer	with	regards	to	the	development	of	his	
philosophical	 hermeneutics	 and	 particularly	 for	 his	 reappropriation	 of	 Aristotle	 and	 the	













words,	 in	 what	 respects	 does	 Gadamer’s	 reappropriation	 of	 Aristotle	 converge	 with	


















sense	 quite	 restrained.	 This	 comparison	 will	 also	 allow	 us	 to	 bring	 forth	 the	 different	
interpretative	styles	 that	characterize	each	one	of	 them	respectively	 in	connection	 to	 the	
interpretation	 and	 understanding	 of	 ancient	 philosophy.	 Given	 that	 Gadamer’s	 debt	 to	
Heidegger	is	indubitable,	this	section	will	mainly	aim	at	stressing	the	ways	in	which	Gadamer	
differs	 from	 his	 mentor,	 as	 we	 think	 that	 these	 differences	 merit	 further	 reflection	 and	
analysis.	Here,	our	aim	is	not	to	determine	which	interpretation	is	better	or	more	accurate.	
Instead,	we	want	 to	 render	 explicit	 the	 intentions	 of	 Heidegger,	which	 propelled	 him	 to	












texts	which	address	 the	notion	of	phronesis.	 In	 this	 first	chapter,	we	will	mainly	 focus	on	
Heidegger’s	 texts	 dealing	 with	 phronesis,	 that	 is	 his	 early	 lectures	 at	 the	 University	 of	






with	 respect	 to	 Aristotle,	 1922),	 the	 lecture	 course	 	 Grundbegriffe	 der	 Aristotelischen	







particular	 temporality	of	 the	 situation	 to	which	Dasein	 is	 confronted.	The	 analysis	 of	 the	
concept	of	Augenblick	in	relation	to	phronesis	partakes	in	his	much	broader	quest	of	arriving	
at	 a	more	 originary	 sense	 of	 temporality	 that	 has	 hitherto	 not	 been	 achieved.	 Secondly,	
phronesis	would	involve	an	unconcealment	of	Dasein’s	own	being,	which	entails	a	distancing	
of	Dasein	 from	 its	 immediate	everyday	engagements	 in	 the	world	and	calls	 for	a	 “seeing-





correspond	 to	 a	 hexis	 meta	 logou.	 Phronesis	 would	 go	 beyond	 reason,	 as	 it	 is	 a	 type	 of	
aisthesis,	which	allows	us	to	grasp	the	eschaton	of	the	situation.	Finally,	phronesis	is	not	to	be	



















conducted.	 Indeed,	Gadamer	criticized	this	branch	of	hermeneutics	as	 it	defeated	 its	own	
purpose	by	attempting	to	fit	in	the	mold	of	objectivity	and	method69.	The	main	tenet	posited	
by	the	nineteenth	century	hermeneutic	tradition	is	that	in	order	to	interpret	accurately	a	text	
one	 must	 retrieve	 the	 intended	 meaning	 of	 the	 author.	 Within	 the	 framework	 of	 this	
particular	conception	of	hermeneutics,	it	is	indeed	possible	for	the	interpreter	to	get	back	at	
the	original	meaning	of	the	text,	and	to	achieve	this	in	an	exhaustive	manner.	Thus,	one	of	







meaning	 in	 the	 text	 which	 exists	 apart	 from	 the	 person	 understanding	 it.	 Therefore,	
according	the	hermeneutics	as	conceived	by	Schleiermacher	and	Dilthey,	there	is	one	valid	
and	 objective	 interpretation,	which,	 in	 using	 the	 appropriate	method	will	 be	 reached	 by	
anyone	regardless	of	his	or	her	historical	vantage	point.	It	is	possible	for	the	interpreter	to	
surpass	his	historical	limitations,	namely	to	suppress	the	temporal	distance,	which	separates	
the	 interpreter	 from	 the	 text	 itself.	 This	 is	 achieved	 through	 the	 disengagement	 of	 the	
interpreter	with	his	or	her	prejudices.	In	other	words,	it	is	possible	to	arrive	at	a	unique	and	
objective	understanding	of	a	text,	as	it	would	be	feasible	for	each	and	every	interpreter	to	do	
away	 with	 the	 prejudices	 of	 his	 or	 her	 era,	 precisely	 in	 order	 to	 attain	 this	 universal	
understanding	and	interpretation	of	the	text.		
	 As	we	have	already	mentioned,	although	Gadamer	shares	similar	ambitions	with	the	
development	of	nineteenth	century	hermeneutics,	 that	 is,	 to	present	an	alternative	to	 the	




he	 accuses	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 hermeneutics	 of	 falling	 into	 the	 trap	 of	 a	 unitary	 and	
universal	method	of	thinking,	which	ultimately	defeats	the	whole	purpose	of	the	movement.	
That	 is	 why	 Gadamer	 developed	 his	 conception	 of	 hermeneutics,	 on	 the	 one	 hand,	 in	
opposition	 to	 Schleiermacher	 and	 Dilthey,	 and	 on	 the	 other	 hand,	 in	 continuity	 with	






of	 hermeneutic	 circle	 elaborated	 by	 Heidegger	 in	 Being	 and	 Time72.	 Gadamer	 uses	 the	




was	 believed	 by	 the	 nineteenth	 century	 hermeneutics	 trend.	 This	 is	 exactly	 the	 point	 of	
contention	between	the	nineteenth	century	hermeneutics	and	the	hermeneutical	conception	
elaborated	by	Heidegger	under	the	influence	of	Husserl,	and	which	directly	contributed	to	
Gadamer’s	 own	notion	 of	 hermeneutics.	 In	 effect,	 Gadamer,	 in	 solidarity	with	Heidegger,	
views	the	hermeneutical	circle	as	a	primordially	ontological	matter.	It	is	considered	to	be	an	
interpretative	 circle	because	we,	 as	 finite	 and	 temporal	beings,	 are	 limited	 insofar	 as	we	
understand	 something,	 i.e.,	 a	 text.	We	 are	 able	 to	 understand	 something	 only	within	 the	




able	 to	 understand	 and	 interpret	 things	 in	 general.	 At	 the	 same	 time,	 Gadamer	 also	
emphasizes	the	fact	that	we	must	open	ourselves	up	to	the	things,	be	it	text	or	tradition,	and	
that	 we	 must	 let	 these	 things	 speak	 to	 us,	 as	 he	 claims	 in	 The	 Problem	 of	 Historical	
Consciousness:	 “A	 consciousness	 formed	 by	 the	 authentic	 hermeneutical	 attitude	 will	 be	
receptive	to	the	origins	and	entirely	foreign	features	of	that	which	comes	to	it	from	outside	










different	 being	 and	 to	 manifest	 its	 own	 truth,	 over	 and	 against	 our	 own	 preconceived	
notions.”73	What	this	passage	shows	us,	 is	that	we	must	not	bracket	the	prejudices	of	our	
own	existence	when	it	comes	to	understanding	something,	but	at	the	same	time	we	must	not	
let	 the	 fore-structures	 of	 our	 existence	 blind	 a	 clear	 and	 authentic	 understanding	 of	 the	
object	we	are	examining.	In	order	to	rectify	this	seeming	paradox,	Gadamer	has	elaborated	
a	 thematization	 of	 our	 prejudices,	 so	 as	 to	 make	 us	 more	 aware	 of	 them	 and	 our	
inescapability	 with	 regards	 to	 these	 presuppositions,	 and	 that	 it	 is	 thanks	 to	 these	





themselves,	 is	 the	 constant	 task	 of	 understanding.	 […]	 Thus,	 it	 is	 quite	 right	 for	 the	
interpreter	 not	 to	 approach	 the	 text	 directly,	 relying	 solely	 on	 the	 fore-meaning	 already	
available	to	him,	but	rather	explicitly	to	examine	the	legitimacy	–i.e.,	the	origin	and	validity	
–of	 the	 fore-meanings	 dwelling	 within	 him.”74	 In	 this	 excerpt,	 Gadamer	 explains	 the	




















but	 embraced	 and	 rendered	 productive,	 he	 holds	 the	 same	 view	 for	 temporal	 distance:	
“Temporal	 distance	 is	 not	 something	 that	must	 be	 overcome.	 This	was,	 rather	 the	 naïve	
assumption	of	historicism,	namely	that	we	must	set	ourselves	within	the	spirit	of	the	age,	
and	 think	with	 its	 ideas	 and	 its	 thoughts,	 not	 with	 our	 own,	 and	 thus	 advance	 towards	
historical	objectivity.	 In	 fact,	 the	 important	 thing	 is	 to	recognise	 the	distance	 in	 time	as	a	
positive	and	productive	possibility	of	understanding.	It	is	not	a	yawning	abyss,	but	is	filled	











and	 fore-conception.	 Heidegger	 posited	 this	 idea	 that	 the	 hermeneutical	 circle	 must	 be	





What	 is	 also	 reappropriated	 by	 Gadamer	 here	 is	 the	 idea	 that	 Dasein	 is	 itself	 a	
historical	being	and	does	not	merely	constitute	a	subjectivity,	which	is	inserted	at	a	certain	
point	 of	 time.	 Rather,	Dasein	 is	 inherently	 historical,	 that	 is,	 the	 tradition	 that	 has	 been	
bestowed	 upon	 it,	 is	 an	 integral	 part	 of	 its	 being.	 Gadamer	 took	 the	 notions	 of	 pre-
understanding	and	historicality,	which	are	inextricably	linked	in	Heidegger’s	hermeneutics	
and	he	further	expanded	on	these	concepts	and	made	them	central	to	his	own	philosophical	
hermeneutics.	 For	 example,	 Gadamer	 develops	 the	 notion	 of	 horizon	 and	 the	 fusion	 of	
horizons,	which	excludes	the	possibility	that	there	are	two	distinct	horizons	that	meet	each	












the	picture,	because	 the	concept	of	a	 fusion	of	horizons	necessarily	 involves	a	process	of	
application.	When	the	interpreter	encounters	the	text,	there	is	a	process	of	application	which	
takes	 place:	 to	 understand	 the	 text	 one	must	 be	 able	 to	 apply	 it	 to	 oneself	 and	 to	 one’s	
situation,	 as	 Gadamer	 puts	 it:	 “Every	 encounter	 with	 tradition	 that	 takes	 place	 within	




our	 present	 situation	 and	 the	 text	 we	 are	 interpreting.	 Instead	 of	 not	 properly	
acknowledging	 the	 full	 extent	 of	 our	 limited	 historical	 point	 of	 view,	 Gadamer	 not	 only	
intends	to	acknowledge	it	but	to	embrace	it,	and	from	this	arrive	at	a	deeper	understanding	
of	both	tradition	and	the	text	in	question.	In	this	next	section,	we	will	examine	this	notion	of	

















hermeneutical	 task,	 namely	 the	 subtilitas	 intelligendi,	 subtilitas	 explicandi,	 and	 subtilitas	










in	 accordance	 with	 the	 way	 legal	 and	 theological	 hermeneutics	 were	 conducted	 in	 the	
eighteenth	century80.	In	other	words,	historical	hermeneutics	must	also	be	in	a	position	to	
adapt	 the	 texts	 and	 apply	 them	 to	 one’s	 own	 context,	 and	 thus,	 overcome	 the	 temporal	
distance.	In	order	to	achieve	this,	application	is	of	central	importance,	given	that	when	we	









in	 the	 text	 that	 he	 reminds	 us	 of	 the	 pertinence	 of	 Aristotle	 in	 dealing	 with	 the	 crucial	
problem	of	application.		
It	is	within	the	ethical	framework	of	Aristotle	that	Gadamer	retrieves	the	notion	of	
phronesis,	which	 is	 intimately	 related	 to	 application.	Although	Aristotle’s	phronesis	 is	 not	
directly	concerned	with	hermeneutics,	Gadamer	has	found	that	his	notion	of	phronesis	comes	
as	a	great	help	in	properly	understanding	the	unfolding	of	hermeneutics,	and	in	giving	a	more	
accurate,	 a	 more	 humane	 conception	 of	 hermeneutics.	 As	 we	 attempted	 to	 explain,	






Gadamer	 retrieves	 the	 centrality	 of	 the	 notion	 of	 subtilitas	 applicandi	 from	 pietist	
hermeneutics.	It	is	precisely	because	the	notion	of	applying	the	text	to	one’s	present	situation	
was	 considered	 detrimental	 to	 an	 objective	 interpretation,	 that	 the	 nineteenth	 century	
hermeneutics	 tried	 to	 minimize	 the	 importance	 of	 application	 in	 the	 process	 of	










right	 estimation	 of	 the	 role	 that	 reason	has	 to	 play	 in	moral	 action.”83	 In	 this	 passage,	 it	












the	 ethical	 equation.	 By	 revaluing	 the	 notion	 of	 application	 and	making	 it	 central	 to	 the	
process	 of	 understanding	 and	 interpreting,	 Gadamer	 avoids	 the	 trap	 of	 mimicking	 the	
natural	 sciences	 and	 instead	 promotes	 a	 conception	 of	 hermeneutics,	 which	 puts	 the	
individual	 and	 his	 inherited	 tradition	 at	 the	 forefront.	 Grondin	 expresses	 this	 idea	 very	
accurately:	“He	had	the	good	fortune	to	remember	that	understanding	or	application	is	less	

















Gadamer	 does	 not	 opt	 for	 relativism,	 he	 rather	 sets	 out	 to	 better	 assess	 the	 role	 that	 is	
assigned	to	reason	in	the	context	of	hermeneutics,	as	did	Aristotle	when	he	confronted	the	
tradition	 of	 Platonic	 intellectualism.	 Ethical	 knowledge,	 as	 discussed	 by	 Aristotle,	 is	 not	
simply	 an	 intellectual	 affair,	 namely	 it	 cannot	 solely	 be	 a	 study	 of	 universal	 claims	 that	
characterize	the	idea	of	good.	Rather,	it	is	the	ability	that	one	has	to	apply	the	good	when	
faced	with	 a	 concrete	 situation.	What	 Gadamer	 challenges	 is	 this	 very	 objectivity,	which	
derives	 from	Plato’s	 intellectualism,	 and	 is	 reinstated	by	 the	 epistemology	of	 the	natural	
sciences,	and	wrongly	transposed	to	the	domain	of	human	sciences	and	human	action:	“The	
alienation	of	 the	 interpreter	 from	the	 interpreted	by	 the	objectifying	methods	of	modern	
science,	 characteristic	 of	 the	hermeneutics	 and	historiography	of	 the	nineteenth	 century,	
appeared	 as	 the	 consequence	 of	 a	 false	 objectification.	 My	 purpose	 in	 returning	 to	 the	
example	of	Aristotelian	ethics	is	to	help	us	realize	and	avoid	this.	”86				
	 It	 is	 following	 the	 discussion	 of	 the	 fusion	 of	 horizons	 and	 the	 importance	 of	 the	










The Special Case of Phronesis	
	 In	 the	 section	 called	The	 Hermeneutic	 Relevance	 of	 Aristotle	 in	Truth	 and	Method,	
Gadamer	discusses	the	peculiar	way	in	which	phronesis	constitutes	an	allos	eidos	gnoseos.	He	
first	claims	that	it	is	to	be	distinguished	from	techne,	as	techne	is	an	objective	skill	that	one	
acquires.	 It	 is	 something	 that	 can	 be	 forgotten	 after	 a	 while,	 especially	 when	 it	 is	 not	
practiced	enough.	But,	moral	knowledge	does	not	resemble	technical	knowledge,	insofar	as	
it	 is	 not	 an	 objective	 skill	 that	 can	 be	 acquired	 through	 teaching	 and	 practice.	 Moral	
knowledge	 is	effectively	a	different	kind	of	knowledge,	precisely	because	 it	 stems	 from	a	
situation	which	we	already	 find	ourselves	 in.	 It	 is	a	knowledge	which	pertains	 to	us,	 it	 is	
inseparable	from	our	being,	whereas	the	art	of	carpentry,	for	example,	relates	to	the	correct	
cutting	 and	 shaping	 of	wood,	which	 takes	 place	 in	 the	 external	 and	material	world.	 The	
crucial	difference	 is	 that	 in	 the	 case	of	moral	knowledge,	 the	 correct	 response	 cannot	be	
determined	 prior	 to	 acknowledging	 the	 facts	 of	 the	 situation,	 whereas	 in	 carpentry,	 for	
instance,	one	can	always	use	the	same	set	of	skills	regardless	of	the	specific	circumstances	in	
which	the	art	is	being	crafted.	And,	precisely	because	this	knowledge	is	inseparable	from	our	
being,	 it	 is	 the	 kind	 of	 knowledge	 that	 cannot	 be	 forgotten.	 This	 is	 another	 fundamental	
characteristic	of	the	kind	of	knowledge	that	phronesis	yields,	namely	that	it	is	unforgettable,	
as	it	is	intimately	linked	with	our	being.	We	can	see	how	this	inability	to	forget	within	the	
unfolding	 of	 phronesis	 is	 to	 be	 traced	 back	 to	 Heidegger	 who	 stated	 that	 phronesis	 is	




consciousness,	 it	 is	 impossible	for	us	to	forget	 it,	and	thus	it	compels	us	to	act	upon	it,	as	
Schmidt	puts	it:	“The	point	that	Gadamer	wants	to	emphasize	here	is	that	I	cannot	hide	from	










technical	 knowledge,	 as	 Gadamer	 writes	 :	 “Hence	 also	 mere	 expediency	 cannot	 enter	
considerations	about	what	might	further	moral	ends;	rather,	the	consideration	of	the	means	
is	 itself	 a	moral	 consideration	 and	 it	 is	 this	 that	 concretizes	 the	moral	 rightness	 of	 then	
end.”88	A	few	lines	later,	Gadamer	writes	that	moral	knowledge	embraces	both	means	and	
















































the	 concerns	 that	 preoccupy	 the	 interpreter	 and	 his	 prejudgments,	which	 are	 ultimately	
unavoidable.	That	is	precisely	how	Gadamer	approaches	Aristotle,	as	Bernstein	claims,	that	
is,	Gadamer	enters	 into	a	dialogue	with	Aristotle,	 carrying	his	own	preoccupations	 in	 the	
conversation,	 namely	 his	 concern	 with	 the	 domination	 of	 scientific	 knowledge	 and	












hermeneutics	 as	 conceived	 by	 Gadamer.	 Gadamer	 put	 forth	 a	 concept	 of	 understanding,	
which	does	not	exclude	our	being;	our	being	cannot	be	left	unaffected	in	the	face	of	true	and	
meaningful	understanding.	 It	 is	precisely	 this	 conception	of	hermeneutics	 that	 renders	 it	
deeply	 ethical	 as	 well.	 In	 the	 next	 section,	 we	 will	 examine	 some	 of	 Gadamer’s	 ethical	
writings	 with	 the	 aim	 of	 rendering	 explicit	 the	 relationship	 between	 ethics	 and	
hermeneutics.		
We	have	to	place	Gadamer’s	reappropriation	of	phronesis	in	Truth	and	Method	within	
an	attempt	 to	 retrieve	 the	value	of	humanism.	 Indeed,	Gadamer,	prior	 to	 introducing	 the	
notion	of	phronesis	in	TM,	discusses	the	notion	of	Bildung,	sensus	communis,	of	judgment	and	
taste,	 all	 epistemological	models	derived	 from	European	humanism,	which	 embrace	 self-
knowledge	 and	 the	 knowledge	 of	 shared	 values	 and	 traditions,	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	






its	 central	 concern	 is	 not	 ethics,	 is	 to	 show	 how	 phronesis	 and	 ethos	 are	 extremely	
















In	order	 to	 fully	understand	 the	 significance	of	phronesis	 and	 the	place	 it	holds	 in	
Gadamer’s	hermeneutics,	it	is	inevitable	that	we	must	address	Gadamer’s	relationship	with	
ethics,	as	phronesis	 a	concept	 that	Aristotle	used	within	an	ethical	 framework.	Therefore,	
phronesis	is,	first	and	foremost	an	ethical	notion	that	Gadamer	adapted	to	his	hermeneutical	
theory.	 In	the	following	section,	we	will	 focus	on	Gadamer’s	views	on	the	ethical,	and	the	
















particularly	 Aristotle’s	 Nicomachean	 Ethics	 has	 always	 been	 a	 driving	 force	 in	 his	
philosophical	 career.	 Indeed,	 as	 our	 task	 here	 is	 also	 to	 render	 explicit	 the	 relationship	
between	hermeneutics	and	ethics,	and	the	role	that	phronesis	has	to	play	in	this	interplay	of	
concepts,	it	is	essential	that	we	examine	some	of	Gadamer’s	essays	pertaining	to	ethics.	The	







further	 substantiate	 this	 claim	made	by	Palmer	 that	Gadamer	 continued	 the	project	 that	
Heidegger	had	started,	namely	to	elaborate	a	more	“original”	ethics.		
	 In	 the	 beginning	 of	 the	 essay,	 Gadamer	 challenges	 the	 long-held	 philosophical	
conviction	 that	 theory	 is	 to	 be	 viewed	 as	 a	 tool	 to	 master	 the	 multiplicity	 of	 empirical	













theory	 and	 practice,	 which	 is	 precisely	 what	 Heidegger	 had	 undertaken	 to	 do.	 It	 is	 in	
continuity	with	what	Heidegger	had	instigated,	namely	an	investigation	that	would	lead	to	a	
more	“original”	ethics,	that	Gadamer	also	developed	his	ethics.	Heidegger	has	not	written	an	





In	 the	 1961	 essay,	 Gadamer	 highlights	 the	 dilemma,	 which	 has	 pervaded	 moral	
philosophy.	 This	 dilemma	 stems	 from	 the	 patent	misconception	 of	 theory	 as	 superior	 to	
practice	and	by	the	same	token	the	notion	that	all	knowing	is	a	theoretical	knowing,	which	
amounts	to	a	knowing	at	a	distance.	We	can	see	how	this	kind	of	knowledge,	which	has	been	
transposed	 to	 the	 ethical,	 is	 quite	 ill-suited	 with	 respect	 to	 the	 ambitions	 of	 an	 ethical	














the	 problem	 of	 methodology	 remains,	 as	 Gadamer	 puts	 its	 very	 explicitly:	 “This	





essay	which	 is	 the	most	 interesting	 for	 the	purposes	of	our	 investigation,	 is	 the	 final	and	
longest	part	of	the	essay,	where	Gadamer	finds	in	Aristotle	the	best	way	out	of	this	ethical	
dilemma.	What	Aristotle	 has	 achieved	 essentially	 is	 to	 distance	 himself	with	 the	 “radical	
intellectualism”	of	Socrates.	Nevertheless,	it	is	important	to	emphasize	that	Gadamer	does	
not	 view	Aristotle’s	 ethics	 as	 opposed	 to	 the	 Socratic-Platonic	 tradition.	 Just	 the	 reverse	
holds,	as	Aristotle,	according	to	Gadamer,	developed	his	ethics	by	following	this	tradition.	
What	is	crucially	different	in	Aristotle’s	ethics	is	the	acute	conscience	of	our	finitude	and	of	
our	 dependability	 on	 external	 circumstances.	 Concretely,	 the	 virtue	 ethics	 posited	 by	
Aristotle	were	able	to	fuse	together	ethical	being	and	ethical	know-how,	as	acting	morally	
does	not	merely	depend	on	possessing	moral	knowledge,	but	is	intimately	connected	with	






















ethics,	 then,	 lies	 in	 the	 mediation	 between	 logos	 and	 ethos,	 between	 the	 subjectivity	 of	
knowing	and	the	substance	of	being.”97	It	is	precisely	this	element	of	Aristotle’s	ethics	that	
attracts	Gadamer	insofar	as	it	is	this	middle	ground	between	reason	and	being,	which	must	
prevail	 in	 the	 conducting	 of	 ethics	 as	well	 as	 in	 the	 unfolding	 of	 hermeneutics.	 It	 is	 the	
balance	that	Aristotle	was	able	to	strike	with	Platonic	intellectualism.	For	Aristotle,	ethics	is	










previous	 essay,	 the	 most	 important	 element	 of	 the	 answer	 lies	 in	 the	 conception	 of	
understanding	as	self-understanding,	which	entails	that	understanding,	as	the	central	object	
of	 hermeneutics,	 necessarily	 involves	 a	 self-understanding.	When	we	 are	 understanding	
something,	be	it	a	text	or	a	conversation,	we	are	inevitably	contributing	to	the	forging	of	our	
Bildung,	our	ethos,	or	our	character	(however	we	want	to	put	it).	A	quotation	from	Dennis	J.	
Schmidt	 makes	 this	 point	 concisely:	 “when	 I	 take	 a	 text	 into	 my	 hands,	 when	 I	 enter	 a	
conversation,	or	engage	the	idioms	of	life	and	other	in	whatever	way	I	do,	the	stakes	are	high	
and,	 in	 the	 end,	what	 is	most	 at	 stake	 is	who	 I	 am	 and	will	 become,	 how	 I	will	 be	with	
others.”98	This	claim	reflects	what	has	been	discussed	earlier,	which	is	central	to	Gadamer’s	
hermeneutics,	namely	that	application	is	never	a	secondary	act	to	understanding,	but	rather	




that	he	presents	 in	his	 essay	On	 the	Possibility	 of	 a	Philosophical	 Ethics,	 that	 is,	 how	 is	 it	
possible	to	construct	a	universal	ethical	framework	considering	that	we	are	all	mortal	beings,	
contingent	upon	our	particular	historical	situation.	The	solution	that	Gadamer	proposes	in	
order	 to	 resolve	 this	 dilemma	 is	 a	 return	 to	 factical	 life	 and	 by	 the	 same	 token	 to	 an	
















practice,	whereas	 the	 inverse	 case	 does	 not	 hold.	 This	 relationship	 is	 equally	 significant	
within	 the	 hermeneutical	 tradition,	 as	 its	 main	 endeavour	 is	 to	 devise	 a	 theory	 of	
understanding	and	interpretation.	Although,	Gadamer	himself	admits	that	what	he	is	doing	
is,	in	effect,	theorizing	about	the	nature	of	understanding,	he	still	believes	that	practice	must	
be	 brought	 back	 at	 the	 epicenter	 of	 hermeneutics.	 It	 is	 in	 following	 his	 predecessor,	






In	 order	 to	 further	 understand	 the	 link	 between	 practical	 philosophy	 and	
hermeneutics,	which	is	absolutely	central	to	Gadamer,	we	must	also	examine	another	one	of	















and	 hermeneutics	 should	 continue	 to	 be	 conducted.	 Just	 as	 with	 ethics	 and	 politics,	
hermeneutics	must	arise	from	practice	and	must	also	lead	to	practice.		



























theory	 and	 practice,	 as	 Aristotle	was	 acutely	 aware	 of	 the	 peculiar	 nature	 of	 the	 object-
domain	of	ethics.	As	opposed	to	Platonic	intellectualism,	Aristotle	did	not	assimilate	ethical	
knowledge	with	mathematical	 knowledge,	which	 according	 to	 him,	 eventually	 leads	 to	 a	





Dunne	 puts	 it:	 “Theory	 here	 contributes	 to	 a	 heightened	 awareness	 on	 the	 part	 of	 the	







theory,	 which	 eventually	 applies	 itself	 to	 a	 concrete	 situation.	 It	 can	 be	 argued	 that	 the	
relationship	between	theory	and	practice	is	on	the	one	hand	reciprocal	and	on	the	other	hand	
circular,	as	practice	feeds	into	theory,	and	theory	feeds	into	practice	as	well.	This	reciprocal	
conception	 of	 the	 relationship	 of	 theory	 and	 practice	 within	 the	 framework	 of	 practical	
philosophy	 is	 exactly	 what	 Gadamer	 appeals	 to	 in	 the	 construction	 of	 his	 theory	 of	
hermeneutics.		








Gadamer	 has	 made	 the	 further	 claim:	 “practical	 philosophy	 is	 more	 than	 a	 mere	
methodological	model	for	the	hermeneutics	sciences.	It	is	also	something	like	its	substantive	
foundation.”103	 In	 this	 claim,	 we	 remark	 the	 significance	 that	 is	 placed	 on	 practical	
philosophy	 for	 Gadamer.	 In	 effect,	 Gadamer	 wants	 hermeneutics	 to	 take	 the	 place	 of	
Aristotle’s	practical	philosophy,	which	was	at	the	antipodes	of	Platonic	intellectualism,	just	










possible	 to	 practice	 itself.	 Gadamer	 views	 theory	 as	 the	 “heightened	 awareness”	 of	 our	
everyday	 experience,	 which	 indubitably	 requires	 reflection	 and	 theorizing:	 “And	 yet	 the	
universal	 desire	 to	 know	 does	 not	 break	 off	 at	 the	 point	 where	 concrete	 practical	
discernment	is	the	decisive	issue.	The	connection	between	the	universal	desire	to	know	and	
concrete	 practical	 discernment	 is	 a	 reciprocal	 one.	 So	 it	 appears	 to	 me	 that	 heightened	
theoretic	 awareness	 about	 the	 experience	 of	 understanding	 and	 the	 practice	 of	






















fact	 that	he	adapts	phronesis	 to	 the	realm	of	hermeneutics.	By	doing	so,	he	 is	not	merely	










The	 most	 important	 divergence	 between	 Heidegger	 and	 Gadamer	 regarding	
phronesis	is	perhaps	the	conditions	of	its	actualization.	Namely,	can	we	meet	the	sufficient	
and	necessary	conditions	 that	will	 favor	 the	actual	concretion	of	phronesis?	 It	 seems	 that	
Heidegger	might	have	a	more	pessimistic	view	of	this	possibility,	whereas	Gadamer	might	
be	more	optimist	and	focused	on	the	actual	practice	of	phronesis.	It	is	in	a	letter	addressed	to	
Richard	 J.	 Bernstein,	 that	 Gadamer	 makes	 this	 point	 clear:	 “Clearly	 your	 [Bernstein’s]	
decisive	argument	is	the	collapse	of	all	principles	in	the	modern	world,	and	I	certainly	agree	
with	you	that	if	this	were	correct,	my	insistence	on	phronesis	would	be	nothing	more	than	





present	with	 life	 as	 it	 is	 actually	 lived	with	 its	 own	 form	 of	 solidarity?	Here,	 in	 fact,	my	
divergence	 from	Heidegger	 is	 fundamental.”106	This	divergence	consists	 in	a	 fundamental	
belief	that	there	is	and	will	always	be	a	bond	of	solidarity	within	society,	which	will	allow	for	
the	proper	exercise	of	phronesis.	As	opposed	to	Nietzsche	and	Heidegger	who	might	think	
that	 this	 task	 is	 almost	 impossible,	 Gadamer	 urges	 us	 to	 hold	 on	 to	 common	 values	 and	
norms,	which	result	from	mutual	understanding:	“Rather,	I	am	concerned	with	the	fact	that	
the	displacement	of	human	reality	never	goes	so	 far	 that	no	 forms	of	 solidarity	exist	any	
longer.	 Plato	 saw	 this	 very	 well:	 there	 is	 no	 city	 so	 corrupted	 that	 it	 does	 not	 realize	
something	 of	 the	 true	 city;	 that	 is	what,	 in	my	 opinion,	 is	 the	 basis	 for	 the	 possibility	 of	
practical	philosophy.”107	This	mark	of	optimism	can	also	be	found	in	Truth	and	Method	where	
Gadamer	also	emphasized	in	a	very	poetic	manner	that	we	should	not	be	preoccupied	by	the	



















is	 feasible,	what	 is	 possible,	what	 is	 correct,	 here	 and	now.”110	 It	 is	 pretty	 clear	 that	 this	
sentence	 is	 an	 explicit	 critique	 of	 Heidegger’s	 way	 of	 conducting	 philosophy.	 Although	
Gadamer	is	heavily	indebted	to	Heidegger,	there	is	still	a	sense	in	which	he	has	rendered	the	
concept	 of	 phronesis	 his	 own,	 by	 integrating	 phronesis	 at	 the	 heart	 of	 the	 problem	 of	
application.	More	importantly,	Gadamer’s	interpretation	of	phronesis	is	quite	different,	in	the	
sense	 that	 Gadamer	 believed	 that	 phronesis	 contains	 an	 irreducible	 dialogical	 character,	
whereas	 Heidegger	 admired	 Aristotle	 for	 having	 gone	 beyond	 Plato’s	 dialectics	 and	 for	
perceiving	the	pernicious	character	of	dialogue	with	respect	to	the	pursuit	for	truth.	On	the	
contrary,	Gadamer	emphasized	 that	 it	 is	 solely	on	 the	basis	of	dialogue	 that	 there	can	be	
mutual	understanding	and	it	is	only	in	this	sense	that	phronesis	can	be	properly	exercised.	
Heidegger	praises	Aristotle	for	distancing	himself	from	the	dialogical	tradition,	ubiquitous	
in	 his	 predecessor	 Plato.	 For	 Heidegger,	 there	 are	 inherent	 limitations	 to	 the	 dialogical	




















language.	 While	 Gadamer	 does	 agree	 that	 the	 growing	 and	 all-pervasive	 technocratic	
consciousness	does	pose	a	threat	to	language,	he	does	not	maintain,	as	Heidegger	does,	that	
it	 is	 impossible	 to	 retrieve	 the	 question	 of	 being	 via	 the	 current	 state	 of	 language.	 As	 a	
consequence,	Gadamer	does	not	appropriate	the	division	of	idle	chatter	and	authentic	modes	
of	disclosure	either,	which	 in	 turn	has	direct	 ramifications	on	his	views	on	 language	and	
dialogue.	For	instance,	Gadamer,	contra	Heidegger,	does	not	contend	that	the	quest	for	truth	
might	be	endangered	when	treated	in	dialogue	or	conversation,	risking	it	being	reduced	to	









































or	 practice.	 Rather,	 an	 “original	 ethics”	 offers	 us	 a	 reflection	 of	what	 allows	 for	 the	 very	
possibility	of	conducting	an	ethical	 life	and	more	broadly	how	we	can	make	sense	of	our	
world	 and	 ourselves	within	 this	world.	 It	 is	 in	 the	 same	 vein	 that	 Gadamer	 pursues	 his	
investigation	 into	 the	 ethical.	 Gadamer	 completely	 revaluated	 the	 relationship	 between	
theory	 and	 practice,	 so	 as	 to	 arrive	 at	 a	 point	 where	 theory	 is	 not	 anymore	 considered	





































and	 posit	 universal	 rules	 and	 fixed	 significations,	 which	 are	 to	 remain	 eternal	 and	
unchangeable.	As	Nancy	puts	it:	“Instead,	“finitude”	means	precisely	the	non-fixing	of	such	a	







open.”120	 The	 finitude	 of	Dasein	 posited	 by	 Heidegger,	 in	 order	 to	 stray	 away	 from	 the	
dogmatism	of	substance	metaphysics	is	not	only	taken	up,	but	also	made	central	by	Gadamer	
in	the	development	of	his	hermeneutics	and	his	ethics.	It	is	precisely	because	we	are	finite	




up	this	notion	that	we	are	 finite	beings	highlighted	by	Heidegger	and	radicalized	 it	 in	his	





















and	 hence	 his	 questions	 pertaining	 to	 ontology	 have	 direct	 implications	 for	 our	
understanding	of	the	ethical	and	more	broadly	how	one	ought	to	live	one’s	life.	In	Gadamer’s	
case,	 the	 same	 holds	 for	 the	 relationship	 between	 hermeneutics	 and	 ethics,	 namely	 that	
hermeneutics	is	deeply	ethical,	that	is	our	understanding	of	the	everyday	world	significantly	




how	 Heidegger	 deems	 Kairos	 to	 be	 a	 crucial	 aspect	 of	 action	 and	 more	 generally	 the	























the	primacy	of	sophia	over	phronesis.	Heidegger’s	project	 is	ontological,	 that	 is,	 to	rethink	
radically	the	ultimate	question	of	Being,	which	has	not	been	properly	addressed	hitherto.	

















discursive.	 Thus,	 phronesis	 does	 not	 possess	 this	 exclusive	 privilege.	 This	 ties	 into	 and	







by	 the	 Platonic	 Socrates,	 and	 by	 the	 powerful	 effect	 of	 the	 poet	 Stefan	 George	 on	 my	
generation.”124	Furthermore,	in	one	of	the	last	published	works	of	Gadamer,	which	is	about	
the	 sixth	book	of	Aristotle’s	Nicomachean	Ethics,	 he	 also	makes	 some	 remarks	 about	 the	
influence	that	Heidegger	exerted	upon	him:	"What	struck	me	today	is	that	in	the	manuscript	
of	Heidegger,	it	is	not	at	all	phronesis	which	comes	to	the	fore	but	rather	the	arete	of	the	bios	
theoretikos,	 sophia.	What	 on	 the	whole	 strikes	me	 the	most	 is	 the	 preponderance	 of	 the	
ontological	interest	which	goes	as	far	as	to	include	the	general	analysis	of	phronesis,	to	such	





be	 prudent	 not	 to	 forget	 the	 actual	 evidence	 which	 points	 to	 Gadamer’s	 significant	
 
124	H.-G.	Gadamer,	A	Letter	by	Hans-Georg	Gadamer	in	Beyond	Objectivism	and	Relativism,	265. 









Gadamer	 seems	 to	 diverge	 in	 some	ways	 from	what	 his	mentor	 had	 contended.	 Indeed,	
Gadamer	 does	 not	 uphold	 the	 model	 of	 sophia,	 but	 he	 opts	 for	 phronesis	 as	 the	






finitude.	 Their	 divergence	 is	 also	 apparent	 when	 it	 comes	 to	 logos.	 Indeed,	 as	 we	 just	
mentioned,	 Heidegger	 and	 Gadamer	 have	 completely	 different	 views	 on	 whether	 logos	
should	prevail	in	the	attainment	of	truth.	For	Heidegger,	monologue	and	vision	prevail,	as	
they	 avoid	 falling	 in	 the	 traps	 of	 everydayness,	 such	 as	 idle	 chatter.	 For	 Gadamer,	 it	 is	
authentic	 dialogue	 which	 triumphs	 over	 monologue	 as	 it	 forces	 to	 question	 one’s	 own	
prejudices	 when	 confronting	 the	 other.	 We	 also	 tried	 to	 make	 clear	 throughout	 this	
comparison	 that	Gadamer	has	distinct	 intentions	 from	his	predecessor.	On	 the	one	hand,	
Heidegger’s	interpretation	of	Aristotle	partakes	in	a	wider-scoped	ontological	project	and	on	










we	will	 resort	 to	some	differences	highlighted	by	 Jean	Grondin126	 ,	who	distinguishes	 the	




For	 instance,	 the	 first	distinction	 that	can	be	 identified	between	Heidegger	and	Gadamer,	
which	is	apparent	throughout	all	the	analysis	that	we	have	conducted,	is	their	different	view	
on	 tradition.	 On	 the	 one	 hand,	 for	 Heidegger,	 it	 is	 clear	 that	 tradition	 must	 undergo	 a	
destructive	 interpretation,	 seeing	 that	 it	 has	 been	 so	 deeply	 concealed	 and	 concealing,	
whereas	on	the	other	hand	Gadamer	does	not	view	tradition	in	such	a	negative	light,	and	his	
attitude	towards	it	is	not	a	destructive	one.	On	the	contrary,	Gadamer	views	tradition	as	a	
fertile	 ground	 for	 the	development	of	 contemporary	philosophy.	More	precisely,	 he	 talks	
about	the	Fruchtbarkeit	of	tradition,	which	we	can	translate	as	fertility	or	even	fruitfulness.	














this	sense,	Gadamer	 is	also	more	acutely	aware	of	 the	 limits	of	Heidegger’s	project	of	 the	
destruction	of	tradition’s	blindly-accepted	sediments,	as	for	him,	it	is	not	possible	to	bring	to	
our	 awareness	 the	 entirety	 of	 these	 pre-judgements,	 which	 are	 constitutive	 of	 our	




conceal	 the	true	essence	of	 the	text.	 Instead,	Gadamer	does	not	 think	of	 interpretation	as	




we	 will	 use	 a	 distinction,	 which	 has	 also	 been	 posited	 by	 J.	 Grondin	 between	 a	
disappropriating	interpretation	and	a	translation-type	interpretation.127		Indeed,	Heidegger’s	















of	 our	 pre-suppositions.	 It	would	 indeed	 be	 pretentious	 on	 our	 behalf	 to	 admit	 that	 this	
constitutes	 an	 attainable	 possibility.	 According	 to	Gadamer,	 there	 is	 an	 inherent	 opacity,	
which	characterizes	our	comprehension	of	things	and	we	must	be	aware	of	this	opacity	and	








ultimately	 amounts	 to	 an	 alternative	 to	 the	 way	 interpretation	 and	 more	 generally	
philosophy	 has	 been	 conducted	 until	 now.	 Furthermore,	 it	 offers	 a	 new	 way	 of	
understanding	the	very	concept	of	understanding.	Understanding	is	no	longer	to	be	ruled	by	
the	methodology	of	the	natural	sciences,	but	instead	can	be	explained	by	the	richer	and	more	







importantly	 hermeneutics	 and	 understanding	 is	 a	 crucial	 part	 in	 the	 building	 of	 one’s	
character	 and	 therefore	 the	 life	 that	 one	 will	 lead.	 Within	 the	 more	 traditional	 ethical	
frameworks	that	constitute	the	bulk	of	today’s	curriculum	on	moral	philosophy,	we	are	not	


















to	 expose	 the	 role	 that	phronesis	occupies	within	 the	 framework	of	 each	of	 the	 thinkers’	
philosophy	 and	 on	 the	 other	 hand	 we	 also	 wanted	 to	 highlight	 the	 continuity	 and	 the	
discontinuity	in	the	relationship	of	Gadamer	to	his	teacher	Heidegger. 
With	respect	to	Heidegger,	his	reappropriation	of	phronesis	is	to	be	located	within	his	
larger	 attempt	 to	 “destroy”	 the	 history	 of	 philosophy	 in	 order	 to	 bring	 to	 light	 a	 more	
authentic	 interpretation.	That	 is	what	he	 intended	 to	do	with	 the	Aristotelean	concept	of	
phronesis	and	more	broadly	with	Aristotle’s	philosophy.	Heidegger	attempted	to	unearth	an	
authentic	interpretation	of	Aristotle	which	had	been	buried	under	the	scholastic	tradition.	
Thus,	 naturally,	 Heidegger	was	 intrigued	 by	 the	 notion	 of	phronesis	 and	 dedicated	 quite	
extensive	work	to	the	subject,	as	it	is	a	way	of	being	concerned	with	action	and	deliberation.	





situation.	 In	 addition,	 our	 close	 reading	 of	 Heidegger’s	 lectures	 revealed	 a	 Heidegger	
concerned	with	the	others	and	the	world,	and	interpreted	phronesis	as	a	caring	for	the	others.	



















We	 also	 arrived	 at	 the	 conclusion	 that	Heidegger,	 although	 he	 saw	 in	phronesis	 a	
unique	way	of	being,	ultimately	upheld	the	primacy	of	sophia.	We	argue	that	he	did	so	as	his	
conception	 of	 authenticity	 bears	 a	 strong	 resemblance	 to	 what	 characterizes	 sophia.	
Nevertheless,	 Heidegger	 does	 not	 reappropriate	 the	 notion	 of	 sophia	 as	 it	 has	 been	
understood	 in	 the	 past	 several	 decades	 in	 the	 history	 of	 philosophy.	 Rather,	 he	 effects	 a	
radical	 transformation	 to	 the	 concept	 of	 sophia	 in	 order	 to	 arrive	 at	 a	 more	 authentic	
understanding	of	it.	However,	phronesis	is	not	to	be	considered	as	inauthenticity,	but	as	the	
















of	 interpretation,	 Gadamer	 insists	 on	 it	 being	 integrated	 into	 the	 phenomenon	 of	
understanding	itself.	That	is	where	the	notion	of	phronesis	enters	into	play,	as	the	peculiar	
nature	and	unfolding	of	phronesis	is	what	Gadamer	deems	to	be	the	appropriate	manner	in	
which	 the	application	of	 a	 text	 to	oneself,	 namely	 the	 fusion	of	horizons	 should	proceed.	
Gadamer	is	primordially	attracted	to	the	notion	of	phronesis	because	it	is	so	distinguishable	




Furthermore,	 Gadamer	 discusses	 phronesis	 in	 some	 of	 his	 later	 essays	 where	 he	
addresses	 phronesis	 within	 an	 ethical	 discussion.	 Gadamer	 upholds	 the	 superiority	 of	










involves	 an	 application	 to	 oneself,	 which	 will	 inevitably	 influence	 one’s	 ethos,	 one’s	
character.	This	 is	precisely	why	we	have	highlighted	 that	hermeneutics	 is	deeply	 ethical,	
specifically	in	the	way	Gadamer	conceives	of	hermeneutics.	Furthermore,	hermeneutics	and	
ethics	 are	 similar	 insofar	 as	 they	 are	 both	 theories,	 hermeneutics	 being	 the	 theory	 of	
interpretation	and	ethics	the	theory	of	the	good	life.	However,	we	have	attempted	to	show	
that	Gadamer	wants	us	to	conceive	of	theory	and	practice	under	a	different	light.	Gadamer	is	
attracted	 by	 the	 radically	 different	 conception	 of	 the	 relationship	 between	 theory	 and	




 In	 the	 latter	 part	 of	 this	 study,	 we	 exposed	 the	 ways	 in	 which	 Heidegger	 and	
Gadamer’s	interpretations	of	phronesis	are	similar	or	dissimilar.	What	strikes	us	the	most,	
and	 not	 surprisingly,	 is	 that	 there	 are,	 for	 the	most	 part,	 a	 lot	 of	 elements	 of	 continuity	
between	Heidegger	 and	Gadamer.	Most	 importantly,	 both	view	phronesis	 as	 an	allo	 eidos	
gnoseos	and	as	constituting	a	radically	different	conception	of	knowledge	than	that	of	the	












circle	 in	 Gadamer’s	 own	 thought	 in	 order	 to	 reinstate	 the	 inevitability	 and	 legitimacy	 of	





















have	 been	 able	 to	 get	 to	 the	 heart	 of	 both	 their	 philosophies,	 and	 specifically	 how	 they	
intended	 to	 transform	 philosophy.	 By	 examining	 the	 notion	 of	 phronesis	within	 a	 more	
contemporary	philosophical	setting,	our	study	wanted	to	show	how	valuable	it	can	be	to	go	
back	to	the	fathers	of	philosophy	and	attempt	to	see	the	merit	in	their	philosophy	even	when	
trying	 to	 fight	 present-day	 battles.	 Indeed,	 we	 firmly	 believe	 that	 the	 more	 human	 and	
empathetic	 approach	 to	 understanding	philosophy	 and	understanding	 one	 another	more	





































	“Phenomenological	 interpretations	 with	 respect	 to	 Aristotle:	 Indication	 of	 the	
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